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PARALYSIS OVER PALESTINE:
QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY
JEFF HALPER
This essay by a prominent Israeli activist grows out of concern that ad-
vocacy efforts in support of the Palestinian cause have remained stuck
at the protest-informational stage of combating disparate manifesta-
tions of the occupation. What is needed, the author argues, is a strategy
to mobilize the vast range of civil society groups—Palestinian, Israeli,
and international—to forge an effective lobbying and advocacy force
that can lend the Palestinian leadership public support and a measure
of parity with Israel. Intended as a starting point for debate, the essay
explores the possibilities of a “middle range” strategy that would articu-
late the essential “red line” elements crucial to any just and sustainable
settlement, provide a coordinated strategy of advocacy, and explore a
range of “endgames,” including a regional approach to resolving the
conflict if the “two-state solution” is found to be impossible because of
irreversible “facts on the ground.”
THE CLAIM THAT WE in Palestine/Israel find ourselves in a historical moment, at a
“fateful crossroads,” sounds like a worn cliche´. How many historical moments
have we entered and passed through, seemingly without fateful consequences,
in the past decades? The illusion that nothing is final, that the occasional “crises”
in the Middle East can be weathered without lasting effect, arises from following
events on a purely political level: conflicts, negotiations, peace plans, initiatives,
policies of one leader or another.
A wider view that includes the “facts on the ground” presents a far differ-
ent picture. The radical physical transformation of Palestine/Israel that took
place in 1948 has been extended and deepened in Israel’s concerted cam-
paign to impose a permanent “matrix of control” over the occupied territo-
ries. In this, I would argue, it has succeeded. Since the occupation began, the
demolition of 12,000 Palestinian homes since 1967;1 the “quiet transfer” of
more than half a million Palestinians from the West Bank, “East” Jerusalem, and
Gaza since the occupation began; the relentless process of “Judaization” that
has transferred more than 70 percent of West Bank land from Palestinian into
Israeli hands; the construction of a vast web of settlement blocs and Israeli-only
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“bypass roads”; the literal imprisonment of millions of Palestinians behind a
“separation barrier”; the impossibility of Palestinian free movement among
their enclaves by external and internal “closures”; the pursuit of policies fos-
tering impoverishment, infrastructural destruction, and dedevelopment; the
institution of military orders and discriminatory laws affecting every detail
of Palestinian life as well as Kafkaesque planning and administrative proce-
dures; undermining the fabric of Palestinian society by coercing thousands of
Palestinians into collaboration; employing state terror on a massive scale to
break the will of the people—all these constitute accumulative “moments”
more uncompromising by far than any mere political development could be.
A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE?
The passing of Arafat has been heralded as the beginning of a new era
offering promising opportunities to resolve what British prime minister Tony
Blair called “the single most pressing political challenge in our world today.”
Hardly was Arafat in his grave than Blair and President Bush solemnly declared
their commitment to revitalizing the moribund road map. Given the diplomatic
paralysis of the past four years and the despair it has sown among all those
working for a just peace in the region, the fact that many see this as heartening
news is understandable.
From a perspective grounded in the physical transformation of Palestine/
Israel, however, the situation looks less encouraging. Israel’s aggressive policy
of creating “facts on the ground” shows no sign of abating. Settlement con-
struction continues apace. The population of Ma’ale Adumim, a settlement-city
controlling both “Greater” Jerusalem and north–south Palestinian movement
in the West Bank, is expected to grow from its present 30,000 to more than
70,000 in the next five years. Israel is planning an entirely new city, Givat Yael,
on the lands of Wallajeh between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which is to have
a population of 55,000 in its first stage. Three ultra-orthodox settlements—
Beitar Ilit to the west of Bethlehem, Tal Zion near Ramallah, and Mod’in Ilit to
the west of Ramallah—are the fastest growing in the West Bank. The construc-
tion of the wall, accompanied by massive land expropriations and population
transfer, also continues. The most recent indication of Israel’s intention to re-
tain permanent control of the West Bank is the plan unveiled in September
2004 for an eighty million dollar network of Palestinian highways, including
sixteen “passages,” bridges and tunnels that give the Palestinians “transporta-
tional” but not territorial contiguity while preserving Israel’s own exclusive
network of settler highways. If Sharon is able to present himself as a statesman
genuinely interested in achieving peace with the Palestinians, it is because he
has completed his program of reconfiguring the country to an extent that a
genuine two-state solution has been rendered impossible. Even if Israel were
to relinquish the vast majority of its settlements and up to 85–90 percent of
the occupied territories, its control would not be endangered in the slightest.
To be sure, Israel’s matrix of control could be dismantled if the international
community had the required political will, since “occupation” is defined in
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international law as a temporary military situation that can only be resolved
through negotiations. Sharon had little to fear concerning political will; for
extra insurance he worked hard to transform Israel’s presence in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem from an occupation into a permanent political fact
recognized and accepted by the only party that matters, the United States.
That was accomplished in June 2004, when the American Congress endorsed,
almost unanimously, the Bush-Sharon agreement of April whereby Israel would
not be required under any future peace process to withdraw to the 1967 lines
or to abandon its major settlement blocs (which the congressional resolution
calls “major Israeli population centers in Israel”). This blatant laundering of
the settlements’ patent illegality represented a radical shift in American foreign
policy, effectively nullifying the basis agreed to by all parties for resolving the
conflict, namely UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which call on
Israel to withdraw from the territories seized in June 1967 in return for security
guarantees from its Arab neighbors. The agreement, now part and parcel of
U.S. policy, also fundamentally contradicts the road map, which calls for an
end to occupation and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state through
negotiations. By removing the settlement blocs from negotiations, Congress and
the Bush administration in effect reduced the territory left for the Palestinians to
negotiate to only 70–80 percent of the West Bank—a truncated 10–15 percent
of the original Palestine. And since then, American empire, in which Israel
plays a key role, has been confirmed by Bush’s reelection.
This is bad news for advocates of a just and sustainable peace. The good
news is that concern over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s destabilizing effects
on Europe and the “moderate” Arab states, including its linkage to global ter-
rorism and radical Islam, has lent it an unprecedented urgency as the conflict
endangering world peace. At the same time, blame for prolonging the conflict
is increasingly shifting from the Palestinians to Israel: some 59 percent of Eu-
ropeans polled by the European Commission in October 2003 named Israel as
the greatest threat to world peace.2 As for the progressive and activist elements
of international civil society, the Palestine/Israel issue has become downright
emblematic. Its “in-your-face” challenge to human rights and international law,
epitomized by the outrageous scale, impact, and audacity of Israel’s separa-
tion wall, is raising the struggle against the occupation to the level of the
anti-apartheid struggle. In other words, the international public is starting to
“get it.” The unequivocal ruling of the International Court of Justice that the
wall being built by “Israel, the occupying power, in the occupied Palestinian
territory. . . is contrary to international law,” ratified by a 150–6 vote in the UN
General Assembly, lends strong legal and moral support to international efforts
to end the occupation.3 So, too, do the American Presbyterian Church’s calls
for “the initiation of a process of phased selective divestment in multinational
corporations operating in Israel”4 and that of the latest European Social Forum
for sanctions on Israel “as long as it continues to violate international law and
the human rights of the Palestinian people.”5
Unfortunately, however, at the very moment when the iron is hot, when
naked Israeli brutality highlights just how intolerable and untenable the
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situation is, when the prospect of a new proactive Palestinian leadership raises
new hopes, we, advocates of a just and viable peace, find ourselves paralyzed.
We lack an agreed-upon and achievable endgame, not to mention the strategy,
organization, and resources to realize it. What it is that we are advocating? A
two-state solution? Does anyone really believe that is still attainable? If not, are
our efforts to end the occupation strategic, or are we simply trying to reach
negotiations with the strongest possible demands? And with the resumption
of negotiations a possibility, how should we engage with the Palestinian lead-
ership, and they with us?
A post-Arafat era might initiate a new, more proactive political dynamic.
Like the South African
whites, Israeli Jews will not
actively resist an end to the
occupation but neither will
they take any proactive
steps to end it by electoral
means.
But effective leadership of what must be an international
effort to defeat Like the South African whites, they will
not actively resist an end to the occupation but neither
will they take any proactive steps to end it by electoral
means, especially given the complete absence of alter-
native political leadership to Sharon on either the part
of Labor or of the Zionist liberal-left led by the Yahad
party of Yossi Beilin.
Israeli apartheid needs more than a new figure. It needs a new political vi-
sion in order to forge an international movement against the occupation and for
Palestinian independence just as effective as the anti-apartheid movement even-
tually became. This is especially crucial since the Israeli Jewish public, much
like the white population of apartheid South Africa, has taken an entirely pas-
sive position regarding the resolution of the conflict. While polls indicate that
up to 70 percent of Israelis have little interest in maintaining the occupation,6
they have been convinced by the leaders of both Labor and Likud that there
is no political solution and no “partner” for peace. Faced with what they see
as an irresolvable situation, hunkering down in the hope that the wall and
Sharon’s brutal repression will bring relief from terrorism, they have literally
taken themselves out of the political game.
With formal diplomatic efforts unlikely to lead to a just and sustainable peace,
the ball is squarely in the court of the international civil society. This being the
case, we urgently need to turn our attention to devising a coherent program, an
effective set of priorities, and effective joint initiatives at a historical junction
when Israel’s occupation is at its strongest yet most vulnerable in years. This
paper is intended to highlight the obstacles to effective advocacy. Where are we
in our struggle for a just and sustainable peace? Where are we going? How are
we going to get there? In this time of transition, these fundamental questions
become more pertinent than ever.
FROM THE “DEFAULT” APPROACH TO A MIDDLE RANGE STRATEGY
What political program should we be advocating? The two-state solution re-
mains the only program supported by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Although
the PA has indicated openness to certain adjustments, it continues to ad-
vance a two-state solution based on a complete end to the occupation, Israeli
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withdrawal to the 1967 lines, and resolution of the refugee issue through a
“package” of restitutive measures (Israeli acceptance of the right of return, ac-
knowledgement of its responsibility in creating the refugee issue, and practical
arrangements for resolving the problem). This “default” approach seems to rest
on the supposition that the occupation will eventually collapse due to its very
injustice, continued Palestinian resistance, sumud (“steadfastness”), and inter-
national pressures and that a Palestinian state will somehow emerge through
some almost mystical historical process to be encouraged but not really di-
rected or led. Palestinian advocacy in such conditions has taken the form more
of litanies of wrongs committed against the Palestinians than effective critiques
of the political situation and proactive measures. (A notable exception is the
challenge to the wall initiated and directed by Nasser al-Kidwa, the PA’s repre-
sentative to the UN.) The default nonstrategy is especially inadequate in that it
is up against Israel’s aggressively proactive initiatives, where the terms (“war
on terror,” “no partner for peace,” “separation”), programs (“disengagement”),
and downright falsehoods (Barak’s “generous offer”) have allowed it to frame
the conflict and thereby control the discourse surrounding it.
What appears to be missing on the Palestinian side are two elements of
effective advocacy: a vision, or at least an achievable endgame, and an effective
strategy accompanied by effective organization. But here a strategic decision
must be made. If we are genuinely advocating a two-state solution, then it can
no longer be merely a default position. The PA must proactively pursue it while
reaffirming to the activist community that this actually is the endgame. If, on
the other hand, a viable two-state solution is adjudged to be gone and is in
fact merely an opening tactical position when negotiations resume, then the
Palestinian leadership, together with its civil society allies at home, in Israel,
and abroad, must formulate a fallback position—actually the “real” endgame.
What this would entail is what may be called a “middle range” strategy. It goes
beyond the current “default” nonstrategy by fostering a vision of where we
are heading, but at the same time it does not commit the Palestinians to a
particular solution and therefore does not undermine the demand to end the
occupation.
A first step toward developing effective middle range advocacy strategy
might be to hold a wide-ranging discussion over possible scenarios, their ac-
ceptability, their likelihood of success, and the operational implications of each.
Exploring a range of options better prepares the Palestinians for the day when
negotiations do indeed resume and when the need for radical alternatives to
the two-state solution may have to be formulated, and quickly. Such brainstorm-
ing helps ensure that any fallback position will be based on principles agreed
upon by the Palestinian and international communities. At the same time, it
encourages activists and advocates to look at the big picture.
WHERE ARE WE GOING? RED LINES AND OPTIONS
The middle range strategy of advocacy being proposed here aims to achieve
a just and sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What, then,
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are the essential elements of such a resolution? These include the following:
 National expression for the two peoples. The conflict is between two
peoples, two nations, each of which claims the collective right of
self-determination. This is what gives such compelling logic to the
two-state solution and what raises questions about the viability of the
one-state idea.
 Viability. Whatever form a Palestinian state takes, it must be viable as
well as sovereign. It must control its borders and basic resources (such
as water) and possess territorial contiguity. Above all, it must be able to
develop a viable economy if it is to be responsible for resettling and
rehabilitating the refugees who choose to return—to say nothing for
coping with its present population, more than 60 percent of which are
under the age of 25, which is traumatized, impoverished, and left with
little education and few skills.
 Refugees. Needless to say, any sustainable peace is dependent upon the
just resolution of the refugee issue. Israel must acknowledge the
refugees’ right of return; it must acknowledge its role in creating the
refugee issue so that a healing process may begin; and only then will a
just resolution be formulated that takes into account both the refugees
right of choice and Israel’s concerns. (Here I believe the confederational
approach, mentioned below, holds great promise.)
 A regional dimension. Despite our almost exclusive focus on
Palestine/Israel, the main issues facing both peoples of that
country—refugees, security, water, economic development,
democratization—are regional in scope and must be addressed
accordingly.
 Israel’s security. Israel’s legitimate security concerns must be addressed.
However, Israel’s concept of security cannot be so broad and
encompass so many elements of control that it leaves no breathing
space for the Palestinians. One way of assuaging basic fears while not
permitting “security” to be used as a pretext for continuing occupation
could be the introduction of a meaningful time dimension in the peace
process.
Defining the essential elements of a just and sustainable peace permits us to
formulate and evaluate the range of alternative solutions. They can be reduced
to four possible options, with only the last one, I would argue, being truly just
and sustainable:
The first is the traditional two-state solution in which a Palestinian state
emerges on all of the occupied territories (with minor adjustments). This is, as
mentioned above, the current “default” position of the PA. I have argued with
others (most notably the PLO’s Negotiations Support Unit and Israeli historian
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Meron Benvenisti) that this option has been all but foreclosed, and I have
yet to hear compelling arguments for its viability. Although the Palestinians
must open any renewed negotiations with their “default” position, it will soon
become evident that it is unachievable.
An “Israel plus, Palestinian minus” version of the two-state solution would
permit a semisovereign, semi- to nonviable Palestinian state to arise in the areas
between settlement blocs. Pursued by both Labor and Likud, the Palestinian
Bantustan idea—“cantonization,” to use Sharon’s phrase—constitutes little
more than a Middle Eastern version of apartheid. Leaders of both parties believe
that with the Palestinians facing military defeat, impoverishment and emigra-
tion/transfer, political isolation and the “Iron Wall” of Israel’s permanent pres-
ence, a “cooperative” Palestinian leadership can be found that would, with
certain cosmetic inducements, accept this option. The Likud and Labor ap-
proaches differ only in detail: the former, loath to relinquish any of the “Land
of Israel,” believes it can impose a smaller ministate; the latter, concerned that
the Bantustan appear “sellable,” advocates a larger but still nonsovereign or
nonviable ministate on up to 85 percent of the territories. The Geneva Ini-
tiative of Yossi Beilin and Yasir ‘Abid Rabbuh is, in my opinion, a benign
version of this option. It is presented as viable mainly because it “compen-
sates” the Palestinians with certain territorial swaps so that they “receive” a
full 22 percent of the original Palestine (the same percentage represented by
the occupied territories). Even so, it leaves the Palestinians with less than a
coherent territory and leaves Israel with the major settlements (including East
Jerusalem), much of “Greater” Jerusalem, and the rich farmlands and water re-
sources of the western West Bank; it also fails adequately to address the refugee
issue.
A single state, either binational (although the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian
populations are too mixed to achieve any territorial discreteness) or demo-
cratic, on the surface seems the most natural alternative to a two-state solution;
after all, it arises out of an Israeli refusal to countenance a viable Palestinian
state and recognizes that Israel itself has made Palestine/Israel into one country
through its settlement enterprise. Yet as a stand-alone solution it suffers from
fatal flaws, most notably total opposition by the Israeli Jewish population and
by a significant sector of the international community (including the United
States and most if not all of Europe) because it entails the transformation of
Israel from a Jewish state into a unitary democratic one (with an almost imme-
diate Palestinian majority even without a refugee return). From the Palestinian
perspective, and even though a single binational state was the official PLO po-
sition, it has serious drawbacks as well, including the prospect of becoming
a permanent underclass given the far stronger institutional, educational, and
economic development of the Israeli Jewish sector. This is a genuine concern,
of course, but it underestimates the vital role that the Palestinian Diaspora
could play in the nation-building process, a major but neglected factor in the
equation. More salient, perhaps, is the argument that with the international
community backing the two-state solution, reaffirmed in UN resolutions going
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back to partition, it is counterproductive to shift to a one-state solution, espe-
cially given the unlikelihood that such an approach would win international
support.
Finally, a “two-state plus” solution envisions an Israeli-Palestinian (and per-
haps Jordanian) confederation (later expanding into a Middle East Union en-
compassing Syria, Lebanon, and other states in the region). Since this intro-
duces a crucial regional dimension, it appears to me the only acceptable and
workable endgame. It represents a win-win approach that addresses the under-
lying cause of the conflict yet respects the integrity of each member state. (This
is not code for a “Jewish” state, but rather for the integrity of Israel as a state in
its own right. Whether Israel eventually evolves into a normal democratic state
belonging to all its citizens is another issue and another process that needn’t
concern us here.) Much like the European Union, a regional confederation
rests on the balance between national sovereignty and the freedom to live and
work within the entire region. It separates, as the traditional two-state pro-
posal can no longer do, the issue of self-determination from that of economic
viability.
This regional approach could take the form of a “two-stage solution.” Rec-
ognizing that Israel will not return to the 1949/1967 lines and not foreseeing
any territorial swaps that will translate into a viable Palestinian state, it asks
that the Palestinians accept a state on something less than the entire occupied
territories (perhaps on the Geneva model or the 96 percent suggested by Clin-
ton) on condition that, within a reasonable period of time (five to ten years),
the international community guarantees the emergence of a regional confed-
eration. In such a confederation all residents have the right to live and work
anywhere they choose. This breaks the Palestinians out of their Bantustan.
Rather than burdening the small emergent state with responsibilities it cannot
possibly fulfill, the confederational approach extends that burden across the
entire region. It also addresses the core of the refugee issue, which is individual
choice. Palestinians residing within the confederation would have the choice
of becoming citizens of the Palestinian state, retaining citizenship in their cur-
rent countries of residence, or leaving the region entirely for a new life abroad.
They could choose to return “home” to what is today Israel, but they would do
so as Palestinian citizens or citizens of another member state. Israel would be
under no obligation to grant them citizenship, just as Israelis (former “settlers”)
living in Palestine would retain their Israeli citizenship. This addresses Israeli
concerns about the integrity of their state while neutralizing the occupation
by integrating the settlements.
Such a win-win scenario also recognizes that because the fundamental prob-
lems underlying the conflict are regional in scope—refugees, water, economic
development, interreligious and interethnic conflicts, security and democrati-
zation, to name just a few—no sustainable peace is possible without addressing
the region as a whole. This relates directly to the issue of the endgame. If, as
I argue, the regional dimension is essential for a sustainable resolution to the
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Israel-Palestine conflict, it is not enough to assume (or hope) that the two-state
solution will “inevitably” evolve into a political form desired by the Palestini-
ans. Indeed, the very first article of the Geneva Initiative, by far the most
liberal and “accommodating” proposal to the Palestinians, states that when
signed the agreement ends the conflict and settles all claims and grievances. In
Israel-speak this means the end of the process, period. No evolution promised,
none intended. Leaving this critical element of the endgame unaddressed only
guarantees an unsustainable political arrangement, an endgame (two states) in
which the required end is missing.
Among the advantages of the middle range strategy is that it allows for
initiating proactive campaigns focused on Israeli attempts to foreclose a just
and sustainable solution, even while being based on an explicit statement of
the “red line” elements that must be part of any negotiated settlement. This
releases us activists from the limitations of the two-state solution while lending
vision, a clear direction, yet flexibility to our advocacy efforts. Middle range
campaigns contribute measurably to international advocacy by presenting a
comprehensive and coherent picture of the conflict to the public, highlighting
issues of prime importance, providing direction to activist groups, and helping
to develop effective strategies of communication and action.
HOW DO WE GET THERE? TOWARD A PROACTIVE CAMPAIGN
OF ADVOCACY
Any international effort to defeat Israeli apartheid needs a clear, compelling
political vision accompanied by an aggressive and well-financed strategy of
advocacy. Whether a new “hot” period of diplomatic activity thrusts the post-
Arafat Palestinian leadership into government-based initiatives and negotiations
or we remain in prolonged periods of “cold” diplomatic inactivity, reinvig-
oration of the international movement against the occupation is crucial. Ef-
fective advocacy empowers the Palestinian leadership in the first instance,
while it prevents Israel and its allies from imposing a fait accompli in the
second.
An effective action plan of middle range advocacy must fundamentally re-
frame the conflict in order to release an alternative just peace logic. It must
also provide nuts-and-bolts organization and funding.
A Fundamental Reframing
Having laid out the essential elements of a just and sustainable settlement,
effective advocacy requires these elements to be placed within a coherent, com-
pelling reframing of the conflict. Israel has succeeded in seizing the framing,
one based on “security” and the need for self-defense, and on the Palestinians
as terrorists and itself as the victim. In this way it controls the parameters of
the discussion, the issues to be addressed, the terms to be used, and, in the
end, the conclusions to be drawn. Reframing is not intended to “answer” the
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Israeli framing. Instead, its purpose is to fundamentally alter the logic and flow
of the discussion.
Reframing rests on a number of key reconceptualizations:
 Israel as the strong party in the conflict. Israel is able to avoid
accountability by presenting itself as the victim. Since victims have no
responsibility and enjoy the sympathy extended to the underdog, this
permits it to act with impunity despite the fact that its economy is three
times larger than the combined economies of Egypt, Palestine, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon; that it is the world’s fourth largest nuclear power
and the fifth largest arms producer; that it possesses nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and has never signed the nonproliferation
treaty or agreed to international inspection; that it is by treaty a
“strategic ally” of the United States—not to mention the fact that it is
the occupying power. Recasting Israel not only as the strong party in
the local conflict with the Palestinians but as the regional superpower it
clearly is would enable us to demand accountability. This reframing
would also serve to alter the public’s perception of the conflict, laying
the foundations, for example, for a campaign of sanctions. Highlighting
human rights violations while disabusing the public of the notion that
Israel is in an existential fight for its life opens the way for demands that
international law—and in particular the fourth Geneva Convention—be
applied.
 The root problem is occupation, not Palestinian terrorism. Framing its
policies as merely defensive responses to Palestinian terrorism while
removing even the term “occupation” from the discourse represents
one of Israel’s great PR successes. A reframing places the occupation at
the very center of the discussion.
 The occupation as a proactive policy. Israel’s framing of its occupation
policies in terms of security and self-defense masks the meticulous
longterm planning that went into creating Israel’s matrix of
control—the settlements, the infrastructure of highways that
incorporate the West Bank and East Jerusalem irreversibly into Israel,
closures, massive land expropriations and house demolitions, the
invasive wall-as-border. We must highlight the occupation’s function as
a proactive claim to the entire country, and expose the internal
contradictions between Israel’s security framing and its proactive
policies. The struggle should be recast proactively as the Palestinian
people’s seeking freedom from oppression.
 The conflict is a political one, not a clash of civilizations. Israel’s
framing depoliticizes the conflict by shifting the blame for its
continuation to the Palestinians, the wider Arab world, and (implicitly)
Islam. This framing, like the post-9/11 discourse to which it is tied,
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presents the conflict as a clash of civilizations, thereby eliminating the
possibility of a political solution; Barak’s famous claim that there is no
“partner for peace” is an aspect of this. Insisting that the conflict is a
political one between two peoples prevents a self-serving mystification
on Israel’s part, while placing the Palestinians on equal footing.
 It is the Palestinians who have made the “generous offer.” The
Palestinians’ repeated recognition of Israel within the 1949/1967
boundaries entails relinquishing their claim to 78 percent of historic
Palestine. Emphasizing this fact is crucial to offsetting the political
mileage Israel has gotten from Barak’s (mythical) “generous offer.” Such
a recasting also calls attention to the peace treaties Israel has with Egypt
and Jordan; formal and semiformal ties with most of the states in the
Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world; and, not least, the
2002 Saudi Initiative in which the Arab League offered Israel regional
integration if it would relinquish its occupation.
 Respect for human rights ultimately serves all parties. Because human
rights are universal and internationally agreed upon, they provide a
useful basis for evaluating a situation and highlighting the sources of
injustice and responsibility. And since Israel is the strong party pursuing
a proactive policy of expansionism in violation of international law,
human rights provides the instrument by which Israel can be held
accountable. A rights-based approach is also valuable in that it addresses
the issue of terrorism, a central element in Israel’s framing. By asserting
the inadmissibility of attacks on civilians, it highlights not only nonstate
terrorism “from below” but also the far more deadly state terrorism
“from above.” Indeed, in terms of the security needs of all the parties to
the conflict, a reframing of the solution that insists on conformity to the
fourth Geneva Convention, UN resolutions, international law, and
human rights conventions provides the most effective “road map” to a
just—and ultimately win-win—resolution.
 An emblematic conflict with global impact. In terms of connecting to
the wider public, one of the first questions we must address is: Why
should I care at all about this conflict? My aim here is not to dictate a
script, but I would only suggest a framing that brings the international
public into the equation. Presenting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as
emblematic serves this purpose. Its significance as an arena in the
struggle between American empire and the incipient forces promoting
human rights and international law should be highlighted. For American
audiences in particular, this question should be supplemented by
considerations of the conflict’s negative impact on the global standing
of the United States. How does the deep American involvement in
sustaining the occupation impact, for example, the “war on terror” that
so preoccupies the American public?
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It has to be said that advocates for a just peace in Palestine/Israel have a much
harder “sell” than did the anti-apartheid movement. Not only do they have to
contend with images of the Arabs (and especially the Palestinians) as terrorists,
greatly compounded by 9/11, but they face a moral framing that makes com-
pelling sense: Jews as victims fighting once again for their existence in a little
state arising from the ashes of the Holocaust. Zionism—and by extension Israeli
policies that are carefully couched in terms of religion, rights, security, and his-
tory’s debt to the Jews—enjoys a legitimacy that apartheid completely lacked.
Thus, while opponents of the apartheid regime were seen as supporting the
forces of liberation and the struggle against racism, critics of Israeli policies are
accused of anti-Semitism. All this obliges us to reframe the conflict in ways that
will help overcome a powerful reluctance to pressure Israel, a situation that,
on the surface at least, the African National Congress did not have to confront.
Organization
Finally, a proactive middle range strategy of advocacy requires much bet-
ter organization and funding. This means, at a minimum, better coordination,
the establishment of forums for ongoing strategizing, and the development of
focused and strategic campaigns.
A middle range approach fostering focused, proactive, coordinated interna-
tional campaigns rivaling Israel’s sophisticated PR efforts would rejuvenate the
network of NGOs, faith-based groups, journalists, academics, and government
officials that stand by the Palestinian cause. As in the “default” approach, the
demand to end the occupation would lie at the center of such campaigns.
While alternative scenarios would be raised, discussed, and evaluated in public
forums, no specific postoccupation plan would be advanced. We might hope
that the PA would play as directed a role as the Israeli government, with its
expansive network of lobbies, diplomats, religious and other groups, NGOs,
the media—indeed, entire governments. (An “Israelization” of American for-
eign policy has been commented upon frequently, most recently by General
Zinni in relation to Iraq.) That being unlikely, we could at least demand that the
PA appoint an international civil society coordinator. This would ensure that
campaigns and actions would conform to the PA agenda, while giving latitude
to activist groups. Similarly, there is a pressing need for better Palestinian rep-
resentation in the world’s capitals and other influential places; effective access
to decision- and opinion-makers would make our collective work all the more
effective.
Important steps have been made to better coordinate the working relations
among the hundreds of civil society groups directly or indirectly involved in the
Palestinian issue. Numerous conferences and meetings have been held on key
topics, and the World, European, and Mediterranean Social Forums are increas-
ingly used as venues for meeting, coordinating, and strategizing. It seems im-
perative, however, to reestablish the International Coordinating Committee on
Palestine, which until the mid-1990s worked out of Geneva. The International
Coordinating Network on Palestine set up by the UN Division of Palestinian
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Rights aspires to provide such a framework but has not yet crystallized as an ef-
fective body. Other global frameworks should also be explored and developed.
On a regional level, the regional coordinating committees that once existed
should be reinvigorated or reestablished. A European Coordinating Committee
on Palestine exists in Belgium and is headed by Senator Pierre Galand but needs
more vigorous leadership. North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia all
lack coordinating committees. (With 120 member organizations, the U.S. Cam-
paign Against the Occupation could fill the function of a U.S. Coordinating
Committee on Palestine if it expanded its mandate from an exclusive focus on
American government support for the occupation to include support for the
advocacy efforts of Palestinian, Israeli, and European organizations.) Without
such coordinating frameworks, the myriad individuals, groups, and organiza-
tions involved in the Palestine issue will find it difficult to transform a global
but unwieldy network of activists into a mobilizable and focused movement
reminiscent of the one against apartheid. Palestinian and Israeli groups need
to find ways in which to interface with their international partners.
Next, we must create effective forums for collective strategizing. The weak-
ness of the PA in providing leadership for the civil society requires first and
foremost a forum for intra-Palestinian discussion involving Palestinians “inside,”
the refugee communities, and the Palestinian Diaspora. Here the various voices
would be heard and lines of strategic campaigning, if not a definitive endgame,
could be thrashed out. Perhaps spokespeople and representatives better able to
articulate the Palestinian case in the halls of power and to guide non-Palestinian
activists and advocates would emerge from this pool. At some point the dis-
cussion should open up to include Israeli (and Diaspora Jewish) partners in
the struggle for a just peace. With all due respect to hesitations to “normalize”
relations with Israelis, a liberation movement unable to differentiate between
genuine partners in the opposing camp and unreliable interlocutors severely
limits its range of effective action.
In this, the Palestinian Diaspora could play a major role. The refugees in the
camps—poor, isolated, fragmentized, virtually invisible, and having the largest
stake in the outcome—have been largely excluded from active participation
in the national dialogue and in the various diplomatic initiatives. The far-flung
Palestinian Diaspora, traditionally an educated and affluent community, well
connected and far more plugged into the international scene than the PA, has
the ability to press and even challenge the Palestinian leadership in a way
the Palestinian NGOs “inside” cannot. So far, this community has been largely
passive aside from occasional solidarity meetings and a few outspoken intellec-
tuals. This is understandable given the reluctance of immigrants to speak out,
especially Muslim Palestinians in the hostile post-9/11 atmosphere. This only
heightens the role that international activists must play, unless a core group of
Palestinian intellectuals and activists, if not the PA itself, takes a more proactive
stance (recognizing the important Diaspora voices that do exist).
Once a structure of advocacy is in place, a well-coordinated set of campaigns
focused on the most relevant issues and target populations may be launched
68 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
with the ultimate aim of becoming a global movement. Here, the occupation
itself must be the focus of the resistance and advocacy efforts. Activist groups in
Israel and abroad, lacking an overarching campaign and strategy, pursue a myr-
iad of very important issues but often are not ones that will actually bring an end
to the occupation. The campaign against the wall, resisting home demolitions,
harvesting olives, boycotting Caterpillar, lobbying to suspend the EU-Israel As-
sociation Agreements, monitoring checkpoints, accompanying Palestinian chil-
dren to school—these and similar activities highlight the sins of the occupation
but collectively do not constitute an effective and coherent campaign to resolve
the conflict. On the contrary, they often come dangerously close to what Paulo
Freire refers to as “dumb activism.”
What is called for are strategic “metacampaigns” that highlight the occupa-
tion and the attendant human rights violations, Israeli accountability, and the
international community’s responsibility toward the Palestinians. Such meta-
campaigns might include a campaign to apply the fourth Geneva Convention
to the occupied territories; a campaign against apartheid; a campaign to freeze
Israeli construction in the occupied territories; a campaign to stop Israel’s use of
U.S. weapons against Palestinian civilians and—not least—a campaign of divest-
ment/sanctions. None of these metacampaigns need to replace important mi-
crocampaigns and actions against particular manifestations of the occupation
such as house demolitions, settlement expansion, or the building of the wall.
PROVIDING SUPPORT IN TIMES OF “HOT” OR “COLD” DIPLOMACY
One of the greatest handicaps we face is trying to formulate coherent and
effective strategies in a situation marked by dramatic shifts between “hot” and
“cold” periods of diplomatic activity. This paper suggests a strategy of civil
society advocacy that assumes long interstices in the diplomatic process. Israel
has long endeavored to delay a final settlement indefinitely—Sharon is on record
as preferring a “longterm interim agreement.” That said, Israel after Arafat also
has an interest in nailing down the Palestinian Bantustan if a quisling Palestinian
“leader”—a “moderate and pragmatic leader” in Israeli code—can be found
who will sign off on it. It is possible, then, that a “hot” period of diplomatic
activity may be on the horizon. Should diplomatic activity in fact heat up,
civil society will have a vital role to play in advocating for a just peace and
strengthening the bargaining position of the Palestinian leadership. If we have
done our work well, the logic and parameters of the Palestinian negotiating
position will be known and understood by the international public. On the
other hand, any serious pressure on Israel to agree to a just solution containing
the essential elements outlined above will result in the long “cold spells” we
have seen in the past (“formaldehyde” in the words of Dov Weisglass, the head
of the Prime Minister’s Office). In either case, hot or cold, grassroots activism—
Palestinian, Israeli, and international alike—will be needed in a political process
that pits a powerful state against an occupied people possessing only a limited
governmental authority with no sovereign territory.
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Energy and commitment are not enough, however. Effective activism re-
quires leadership and direction, first from the PA, then from Palestinian civil
society, and finally from the Israeli peace camp—none of which we have re-
ceived. Our collective ability to exploit the present historical moment calls for
urgent consultation, intra-Palestinian as well as with Israeli and international
partners, leading to effective action. But in order to maintain public support,
especially given Israel’s sophisticated PR, the Palestinian leadership must com-
municate and engage with us. I hope that in the post-Arafat era the Palestinian
leadership appreciates this.
I hope that this paper will generate constructive discussion and action. A
middle range approach that generates a proactive strategy of advocacy has the
potential to become a global movement akin to the anti-apartheid struggle. Un-
der Palestinian guidance, but in coordination with the Israeli peace movement
and international activists, such a movement must provide direction, effective
forums for strategizing, reframing and the formulation of focused and strategic
campaigns. It must impart a vision, principles, red lines, and alternative sce-
narios. These are critical steps at this historical moment. As the old slogan has
it: “When the people lead, the leaders follow.”
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